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INTRODUCTION

In seeking to limit the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic,
health authorities worldwide are reflecting on their ability to
trace and track those who might have contracted the virus, and
in turn, to know and protect those humans likely to be exposed.
We suggest that the issue around technological innovations,
including so-called contact tracing apps, is not whether they
have a role to play in containing the pandemic, but rather, how
those apps are used and what protections and rights might be
given and guaranteed to concerned citizens using those apps.
This paper examines the difficulties that have arisen in
Australia in the use of its contact-tracing app. We examine the
privacy implications around the use of the app, the wider
economic imperative, and the balancing of those concerns
against the health threat of the COVID-19 pandemic. We posit
that default options are superior in times of emergency and
rather than begging for the adoption of lifesaving technology, we
suggest that the evidence gathered by behavioral economists
provides an apposite and powerful alternative worthy of
consideration.
II.

BACKGROUND

The key with a pandemic, such as COVID-19, is to limit the
rate of spread as quickly and efficiently as possible. One method
used by health authorities is utilizing existing technology that
can be easily co-opted or adapted.1 For example, apps have been
developed to provide breaking news and reports, information
and updates, and geofencing of hot spots.2 In Australia and
1 Such methods were proposed by elite academics at the beginning of the
COVID-19 pandemic. See Digital contact tracing can slow or even stop
coronavirus transmission and ease us out of lockdown, UNIV. OF OXFORD:
CORONAVIRUS
RESEARCH
(Apr.
16,
2020),
https://www.research.ox.ac.uk/Article/2020-04-16-digital-contact-tracing-canslow-or-even-stop-coronavirus-transmission-and-ease-us-out-of-lockdown.
2 See Patrick Anthony Drury et al., Ethical considerations to guide the use
of digital proximity tracking technologies for COVID-19 contact tracing, at 1,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
[WHO]
(2020),
https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019-nCoVEthics_Contact_tracing_apps-2020.1, for a discussion by the World Health
Organization regarding the use of digital proximity tracking technologies as a
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other countries, a form of contact tracing, which includes
feedback, has also been incorporated in the apps to notify those
who are vulnerable or close to otherwise unknown dangers in a
timely way.3 The ability to use technological innovation,
including so-called contact tracing apps, is useful; however,
these technologies pose implications for governments and those
they seek to protect with regard to how individual citizens’
information and data collected by the app will be used and
protected.4
The World Health Organization (WHO) reports daily on the
status of the COVID-19 pandemic world-wide.5 As of October 9,
2020, there were over 50,000,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19
and over 1,200,000 reported COVID-19 related deaths globally.6
While comparisons with the Bubonic Plague in the fourteenth
century—which killed around 200 million people7—have
inevitably surfaced, we posit that comparisons to historic events
are somewhat crude, because of significant differences in
economies, living standards, and health care between the points
of comparison. Gavi, the global vaccine alliance,8 asserts that
potential tool to support contact tracing for COVID-19.
3 Luca Ferretti et al., Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests
epidemic control with digital contact tracing,
AM. ASS’N FOR ADVANCEMENT
SCIENCE, May 8, 2020, at 4.
4 Todd Ehret, Data privacy laws collide with contact tracing efforts;
privacy
is
prevailing,
REUTERS (July
21,
2020,
2:36
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-data-privacy-contact-tracing/dataprivacy-laws-collide-with-contact-tracing-efforts-privacy-is-prevailingidUSKCN24M1NL. Concerns around the information collected from apps
continue even after testing and are often complex considerations, balancing
health issues against privacy protection. See Genetic Alliance, Advocates are
(June
4,
2010),
Leaders
in
BioBanking,
YOUTUBE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U0ES0yDWryM.
5 Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) Weekly Epidemiological Update and
Weekly
Operational
Update,
WHO,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/situationreports (last visited Nov. 12, 2020).
6 WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, WHO (Nov. 9, 2020,
2:46 PM), https://covid19.who.int.
7 Pat Lee Shipman, The Bright Side of the Black Death, AM. SCIENTIST,
Nov.–Dec. 2014, at 410.
8 See GAVI: THE VACCINE ALL., http://www.gavi.org (last visited Nov. 12,
2020). Gavi’s partners include, inter alia, UNICEF, Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation, The World Health Organization, and The World Bank. Id.
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recent pandemics, such as the Asian flu of 1957–1958—which
killed around 1.1 million people—and the Hong Kong flu of
1968–1970—which killed around one million people—provides a
more useful comparison.9 Nonetheless, as the worldwide
fatalities from COVID-19 reached close to 800,000 in August
2020,10 and with so-called second wave effects being experienced,
longer-run comparisons are inevitable, even if somewhat
flawed.11
While disease and death—together with the community
concerns around protecting the vulnerable—are motivating
factors for governments to take action, economic considerations
appear to be equally compelling. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) Blog predicts that the economic downturn caused by
the COVID-19 pandemic is the worst since the Great Depression
and that world economic growth will fall to negative three
percent.12 The IMF provides a comprehensive summary of
discretionary actions taken by 197 economies worldwide.13
These measures include public spending adjustments, taxation
measures, and other policy support, summarized by country.14
The variation and degree of border closures are concerning
since a key commonality with COVID-19 and previous global

How does COVID-19 compare to past pandemics?, GAVI: THE VACCINE
ALL. (June 1, 2020), https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/how-does-covid-19compare-past-pandemics.
10 Lisa Shumaker, Global Coronavirus Deaths Exceed 800,000, REUTERS
(Aug. 22, 2020, 4:48 PM), reuters.com/article/us-health-coronaviruscasualties/global-coronavirus-deaths-exceed-800000-idUSKBN25I0QS.
11 See How does COVID-19 compare to past pandemics?, supra note 9.
12 Gita Gopinath, The Great Lockdown: Worst Economic Downturn Since
the
Great
Depression,
IMFBLOG
(Apr.
14,
2020),
https://blogs.imf.org/2020/04/14/the-great-lockdown-worst-economicdownturn-since-the-great-depression/.
13 Policy Responses to COVID-19: Policy Tracker, INT’L MONETARY FUND
[IMF],
https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-toCOVID-19 (last visited Nov. 12, 2020).
14 Id.; see also Lora Jones, Daniele Palumbo & David Brown, Coronavirus:
A visual guide to the economic impact, BBC NEWS (June 29, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51706225
(examining
COVID-19’s
negative impact worldwide on stock markets, unemployment rates, travel, oil
prices, and shopping).
9
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pandemics is the use of masks15 and isolation,16 with the latter
factor being the primary predictor of containment,17 although
evidence for this claim is primarily anecdotal because of the
absence of verifiable data.18
The variability of measures taken in different regions and
the medical uncertainties associated with COVID-19 show that
the desire to keep economies operating as being both firm and
unrelenting.19 In the absence of data, we posit that economic
objectives are playing a key role in government decisions around
physical isolation and that government measures taken across

15 Bruno J. Strasser & Thomas Schlich, The Art of Medicine: A History of
the Medical Mask and the Rise of Throwaway Culture, 396 LANCET 19, 19–20
(2020); see generally C. Raina MacIntyre et al., Face Mask Use and Control of
Respiratory Virus Transmission in Households, 15 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES
J.
233
(2009),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2662657/pdf/081167_finalRCME.pdf, for a post-survey analysis regarding the effectiveness of
different types of masks for preventing the spread of viruses.
16 Phillip Connor, More than nine-in-ten people worldwide live in countries
with travel restrictions amid COVID-19, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/?p=361112.
17 Laura Spinney, Closed borders and ‘black weddings’: what the 1918 flu
teaches us about coronavirus, GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2020, 2:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/11/closed-borders-and-blackweddings-what-the-1918-flu-teaches-us-about-coronavirus. The U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has stated that both physical and
social distancing is helpful because COVID-19 “spreads mainly among people
who are in close contact . . . [via] droplets from their mouth or nose [which] are
launched into the air and land in the mouths or noses of people nearby” and
that inhalation via the lungs is also possible. See Social Distancing: Keep a
Safe Distance to Slow the Spread, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/socialdistancing.html (last updated Nov. 17, 2020). Further, because “people who are
infected but do not have symptoms likely also play a role in the spread of
COVID-19[,]” the virus may be unwittingly spread. Id. It is also the case that
social isolation reduces the contact with surfaces and environments where the
individual has less control over its cleanliness. Id.
18 David Adam, The Effects of Physical Isolation on the Pandemic
Quantified, THESCIENTIST (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.the-scientist.com/newsopinion/the-effects-of-physical-isolation-on-the-pandemic-quantified-67407.
19 Emeline Han et al., Lessons Learnt From Easing COVID-19
Restrictions: An Analysis of Countries and Regions in Asia Pacific and Europe,
396 LANCET 1524, 1524–25 (2020); see Policy Responses to COVID-19, supra
note 13.
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the world thus far show that the varying degrees of physical
isolation, viewed as “necessary,” are informed by the relative
weight given to each of the above motivating factors. This results
in significant variability among countries when comparing their
interests and relative actions with respect to border closures.20
Technology now plays a role in assisting governments in the
local management of the pandemic, with the aim of improving
both the health and economic position as quickly as possible.21
III. BIOBANK DATA
Data retrieval through the use of digital technology is
essential to governments and others to assist with providing
timely responses in urgent circumstances, such as a pandemic.22
In 2013, the European Commission published a report setting
out, based on empirical evidence, its view on the best means of
governing biobanks and biomolecular resource collections.23 The
Report notes that biobanks are a more recent phenomenon and
mostly have developed from the rise of cancer research.24

Connor, supra note 16.
U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, UN/DESA Policy Brief #61: COVID19: Embracing Digital Government during the Pandemic and Beyond (Apr. 14,
2020), https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policybrief-61-covid-19-embracing-digital-government-during-the-pandemic-andbeyond/.
22 Id.
23 See BIOBANKING AND BIOMOLECULAR RES. RSCH. INFRASTRUCTURE &
EUR. RSCH. INFRASTRUCTURE CONSORTIUM (BBMRI-ERIC), BIOBANKS AND THE
PUBLIC: GOVERNING BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH RESOURCES IN EUROPE 11 (2013),
https://www.bbmri-eric.eu/wp-content/uploads/BBMRI-Biobanks-and-thePublic.pdf [hereinafter BBMRI Report], for a summary of research undertaken
by the Working Group of Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues (ELSI) of the
BioBanking and Biomolecular Resources Research Infrastructure (BBMRI)
project. The Report makes several points regarding biological sampling,
including that it occurs across a variety of sites and for a variety of purposes,
that it comes in the advent of great interest by governments in public health
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and that tissue samples have been
stored “at least since the beginning of the 19th century.” Id.
24 Id. at 13. Because researchers require large data samples, some
biobanks are “created by compiling collections of samples and data from
multiple research projects . . . .” See Maureen E. Smith & Sharon Aufox,
Biobanking: The Melding of Research with Clinical Care, 1 CURRENT GENETIC
MED. REP. 122, 123 (2013); see also Catherine A. McCarty et al., The eMERGE
Network: A consortium of biorepositories linked to electronic medical records
20
21
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Helpfully, the Report attempts to explain the word “biobank” as
“an ambiguous term with more than one meaning, usually
referring to a hybrid infrastructure that links collections of
biological materials obtained from healthy or diseased
individuals to diverse collections of medical or biomedical data,
and including patient records.”25 Because biobanks hold the
medical samples and biological information around those
samples, they are holders of valuable and confidential medical
data.26 The Report clarifies that the term “biobank” is not a
strictly technical term, it “rather refers to a set of practices for
collecting and storing biological materials, as well as medical
and biomedical data.”27 For the purposes of this paper, we adopt
the broader practical definition of “biobank” to include biological,
medical, and biomedical data.
The practice of medicine and related biological endeavors
today are neither confined to professional practice, nor
government laboratories, or hospitals. The growth of biobanking
coincides with the commercial development of related research
and private enterprises, which seek to exploit the collected
information and samples for commercial gain.28 An example of
a for-profit enterprise is Amgen, a private shareholder-based
multinational U.S.-based company.29 Amgen is one of the
world’s largest biotechnological companies, turning over
approximately 25 billion USD per year.30 Amgen and other
private companies hold data that is private.31

data for conducting genomic studies, BMC MED. GENOMICS, Jan. 26, 2011, at 2
(discussing various biobanks who cooperate with one another to further
research by network, often between countries).
25 BBMRI Report, supra note 23, at 13.
26 See id. at 10.
27 Id. at 14.
28 Carlo Petrini, Ethical and Legal Considerations Regarding the
Ownership and Commercial Use of Human Biological Materials and Their
Derivatives, 3 J. BLOOD MED. 87, 88 (2012).
29 AMGEN, https://www.amgen.com/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2020).
30 Agmen Reports Second Quarter 2020 Financial Results, AMGEN (July
28,
2020),
https://investors.amgen.com/news-releases/news-releasedetails/amgen-reports-second-quarter-2020-financial-results.
31 Privacy
Statement, AMGEN, https://www.amgen.com.au/privacystatement/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). Amgen asserts that it is “careful to only
collect and/or use personal identifiable information for the purposes stated in
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It is not just the endeavor or enterprise of biobanking that
is of concern, but it is also the variety of ways in which data is
held, and the opportunity for cross-collaboration of biobank data
Crossbetween for-profit and non-profit institutions.32
collaboration may present opportunities across manifold
software platforms, which allows unrelated third-party interests
to mine or acquire the data for their own unknown, and possibly
commercial, purposes.33
The vast number of technological networks and
collaborations that hold medical and biomedical information for
a variety of uses, including, for example, the development of
precision medicines to treat rare diseases,34 means that it is
possible for such data to assist in determining the likely spread
of disease which is evident in countries where the data is shared,
such as the United States, much of Europe, and parts of AsiaPacific.35 Where data sharing already exists—including the sale
of data between private biobanks—it is possible that even
further sharing may be used by governments who better
our Privacy Authorization for our Patient Support Programs and as necessary
to provide the services and/or programs the patient or customer chooses to
enroll into.” Amgen’s Privacy Pledge to U.S. Patients Enrolling in Patient
Support
Programs
for
Our
Marketed
Products,
AMGEN,
https://www.amgen.com/about/how-we-operate/policies-practices-anddisclosures/privacy-pledge-to-patients/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). “Amgen
practices are consistent with federal and state privacy laws.” Id. “Amgen
program enrollment is voluntary and always provides patients with an easy
option to cancel participation.” Id.
32 See Smith & Aufox, supra note 24, at 123.
33 See id. at 125–26, for a discussion concerning the informational power
surrounding the aggregation and sharing of data for research and clinical
implementation. This includes unwitting stakeholders. See also Byron Tau,
U.S. Government Contractor Embedded Software in Apps to Track Phones,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-sgovernment-contractor-embedded-software-in-apps-to-track-phones11596808801 (reporting that Anomaly Six LLC, a U.S. Virginia-based
company, maintains ties to the U.S. defense and intelligence communities who
are contact-tracing hundreds of millions of mobile phones worldwide).
34 See,
for example, Mission and Goals, NAT’L INST. HEALTH,
https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/mission-goals (last updated July,
27, 2017), which is one agency that “develop[s], maintain[s], and renew[s]
scientific human and physical resources that will ensure the Nation’s
capability to prevent disease . . . .”
35 Han, supra note 19, at 1526–27.
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understand exposure to diseases in order to determine where a
pandemic, such as COVID-19, exists.36 The difficulty of
identifying when it is necessary to make such determinations
remains. There is little doubt, however, that this is a whole-ofsociety problem, rather than one confined to a geographic region
or particular government purview.37 It is also complex because
the vast store of private and public biomedical and medical
information allows for analysis in unexpected purposes, such as
utilization for widespread public analysis.38 This, in turn, allows
for the development of a coalition of interests in using the
information in the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic.39
Furthermore, existing databases that can be shared may be
enhanced by the addition of information gathered from apps
installed by individuals. Generally, and of more concern in

For example, at the outbreak of COVID-19, “China established a
nationwide telecom data analysis platform under the leadership of the
Ministry of Information Industry Technology” allowing telecom carriers to
provide a tracking record of cell phone users’ locations for up to thirty days.
Contact tracing apps: A new world for data privacy, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT
(Oct.
2020),
https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/enus/knowledge/publications/d7a9a296/contact-tracing-apps-a-new-world-fordata-privac [hereinafter Norton Rose Fulbright Study].
37 See Open access to facilitate research and information on COVID-19,
UNESCO,
https://en.unesco.org/covid19/communicationinformationresponse/opensolutio
ns (last visited Nov. 13, 2020).
38 See Sherrie Xie et al., Enhancing Electronic Health Record Data with
Geospatial Information, 2017 AMIA JOINT SUMMITS ON TRANSNAT’L SCI. PROC.
123, 123–32, for an example of a coalition that is already engaged in other
contexts, such as geospatial analysis combined with electronic health records
to improve diagnosis and assist asthma patients. Specifically, these
proceedings note that “[s]ignificant geospatial variability of asthma
exacerbations w[ere] found using generalized additive models, even after
adjusting for demographic factors” and that the “work shows that geospatial
data can be used to cost-effectively enhance EHR [electronic health record]
data.” Id. at 123.
39 This warrants further thought and development. See generally FLORIAN
RABITZ, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF GENETIC RESOURCES: INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS (2017); and CHRISTINA SAMPOGNA,
CREATION AND GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN GENETIC RESEARCH DATABASES (2006),
for discussions regarding the commonality governance architecture in world
politics with genetic resources to attempt to remove asymmetries and garner
widespread access and benefit-sharing.
36
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recent times, are government directives that claim that the use
of personal data gathering is justifiable to safeguard individuals
and others in their particular geographic location. Governments
or private providers, as such, who hold valuable data can no
longer guarantee that the data will be used solely for one
purpose, or, at best, for purposes consistent with the intended
reason stated for the collection of the data. This is because the
transfer and sharing of biomedical and medical data will
inevitably become caught up in the collision of data and
analytics.40 This, in turn, means that soon, private providers
will not be the keepers of the data who control the users of such
data.41 Based on trends observed in 2020, we predict that the
traditional data and analytics roles in information technology
(IT) will remain in diminishing prominence and that other
stakeholders, such as those representing consumer use, research
applications, planning, and other exploratory purposes, will
become more apparent.42 This means that biobanking, along
with cross-sharing of data, will not only just continue to occur,
but from a variety of sources. What is more troublingly is that
the data will be mined and used by any interested party able to
obtain legal (or illegal) access.43 Much has been written around
the potential privacy issues that arise from these increasingly
complex possibilities.44

40 See Laurence Goasduff, Gartner Top 10 Trends in Data and Analytics
for
2020,
GARTNER
(Oct.
19,
2020),
https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/gartner-top-10-trends-in-dataand-analytics-for-2020/.
41 See id.
42 This is an entirely reasonable prediction given the pace at which data
is being collected and the variety of uses to which it is being put to use. See
also id. (noting the rapid effect graph technologies are expected to have on the
ability to collect and analyze data retrieved from organizations, people, and
transactions by 2023).
43 The question of illegal access is important but lies beyond the scope of
this paper. See Wencheng Yang & Song Wang, Fingerprint and face scanners
aren’t as secure as we think they are, CONVERSATION (Mar. 5, 2019, 11:00 PM),
https://theconversation.com/fingerprint-and-face-scanners-arent-as-secure-aswe-think-they-are-112414, for a list of ways in which biometric data security
might be breached.
44 Matthew B. Kugler, From Identification to Identity Theft: Public
Perceptions of Biometric Privacy Harms, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 107, 108 (2019);
see also JP Raynal, Note, With Great Technology Comes Great Responsibility:
Why Smartphone Users’ Biometric Data Needs to Be Protected, 48 HOFSTRA L.
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IV. CONTACT TRACING
Mobile computer applications are important because they
enable contact-tracing, the ability to trace and monitor the
contacts of infected people, and the follow-on implications
associated with a disease.45 Such contact tracing is critical to
containing the disease and subsequent economic recovery.46
Contact-tracing apps, therefore, assist governments in
determining likely infection and specific areas requiring
isolation, which is consistent with the leading historical
indicator of curbing pandemics via the physical isolation of
populations.47 Contact tracing is additionally useful because it
REV. 179, 179–80 (2019) (discussing cell phones); Lauren Stewart, Big Data
Discrimination: Maintaining Protection of Individual Privacy Without
Disincentivizing Businesses’ Use of Biometric Data to Enhance Security, 60
B.C. L. REV. 349, 349–50 (2019) (discussing data discrimination); Jordan T.
Shewmaker, Note, New Frontiers in Medical Privacy: Protecting the Biometric
Data of Patients in the Healthcare Industry, 106 KY. L. J. 813, 815 (2018)
(discussing medical collection in hospitals); Grayson Colt Holmes, Note, The
New Employment Verification Act: The Functionality and Constitutionality of
Biometrics in the Hiring Process, 43 CONN. L. REV. 673, 678 (2010) (discussing
employment); Margaret Hu, Biometric Cyberintelligence and the Posse
Comitatus Act, 66 EMORY L. J. 697, 699 (2017) (discussing military
surveillance); David Uberti, Police Requests for Google Users’ Location
Histories Face New Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (July 27, 2020, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/police-requests-for-google-users-locationhistories-face-new-scrutiny-11595842201 (discussing law enforcement);
Google Helps Police With Geofence Warrants But Warns of Potential Privacy
Problems, WALL ST. J. PRO: CYBERSECURITY (July 27, 2020, 8:45 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cyber-daily-google-helps-police-with-geofencewarrants-but-warns-of-potential-privacy-problems-blackbaud-hack-buggyemail-at-election-offices-11595853947?st=s2nk1yc826toap5 (discussing law
enforcement). Note that this problem is not germane to the health industry
and in banking and finance, similar issues arise. See Meredith E. Bock,
Biometrics and Banking: Assessing the Adequacy of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. 309, 309–10 (2020), for an argument that the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s (GLBA) privacy provisions should be updated to
cope with biometric privacy issues.
45 See Contact Tracing: Get and Keep America Open: Supporting states,
tribes, localities, and territories, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/open-america/contacttracing/index.html (last updated Nov. 10, 2020).
46 See Aaron Hutchins, Coronavirus: The bearers of bad news: Contact
tracers are the new front line in our pandemic battle and economic recovery
depends on them. No pressure, there, MACLEAN’S, Aug. 2020 at 48, 51–52.
47 See Robert Hinch et. al., Effective Configurations of a Digital Contact
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helps avoid the total shutdown of a country or a region’s economy
as a large-scale response to a pandemic.48
Contact-tracing apps were developed to help tackle the
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and are based on two components.49
First, the technological component requires that there is
precision in determining the location of an event as well as the
protection of data about a person being kept secure.50 Second,
the epidemiological component must be sound and sensitivity
analysis tested in simulation so that the app can be audited and
optimized as data becomes available.51
The success of a contact-tracing app is measured by its
ability to reduce onward transmission of a virus and, according
to the NHSX Report, its simultaneous impact on “minimising
the number of people in quarantine.”52 It seems that the latter
impact might usually be followed by control of transmission of
the virus. Nonetheless, whether a reduction of those who might
have otherwise been quarantined is a difficult matter of
estimation since it posits a known quantity—the number of
people in fact quarantined, against the more difficult-todetermine unknown number that might have been in
quarantine—but for the operation of the contact-tracing app.
The success of such an app, at least for the NHSX Report, will
be enhanced where self-reporting of symptoms is prevalent,
along with rapid follow up of cases.53 In some countries, because
people over the age of 70 are unlikely to utilize cell phones and
have an increased vulnerability to COVID-19, the NHSX Report
Tracing
App:
A
report
to
NHSX
1–2
(Apr.
16,
2020,
https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/1009/Report__Effective_App_Configurations.pdf?1587531217 [hereinafter NHSX Report].
See also Contact tracing apps: Which countries are doing what,
ETHEALTHWORLD
(Apr.
29,
2020),
https://health.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/diagnostics/contacttracing-apps-which-countries-are-doing-what/75440095, for an outline of the
movement toward contact tracing apps.
48 NHSX Report, supra note 47 at 2.
49 Id. at 1.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 2.
53 Id.
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recommends that they fully or partially self-isolate.54 The
NHSX Report also finds that under those circumstances “the
epidemic can be suppressed with 80% of all smartphone users
using the app . . . .”55 Additional information on how the NHSX
Report models information and makes assumptions is contained
therein.56
One issue arising from the above is the use of smartphones
which is required, as well as the self-reporting required to
ensure the integrity of gathered data. It is not clear whether
any country has succeeded in achieving those twin goals, or more
generally, that any has been able to report that contact-tracing
apps have been successful in containing COVID-19.57
Various reasons are posited for both the success and lack
thereof of contact-tracing apps. One reason is the reluctance of
some countries to use the Apple-Google “decentralized”
frameworks for contact tracing apps, which are not based on
GPS tracking, but rather Bluetooth® technology in order to
protect user data and to extend the range of the app while
traveling.58 The key point is whether a Bluetooth® contacttracing app has the ability to be designed with a guarantee that
user privacy and security are embedded features.59

NHSX Report, supra note 47 at 2.
Id. at 3.
56 See id. at 8–11, 13–15, 22–29 (utilizing graphs and models to support
assumptions based on self-diagnoses, contact-tracing, and utilization of an
app).
57 Ryan Browne, Why coronavirus contact-tracing apps aren’t yet the ‘game
changer’ authorities hoped they’d be, CNBC (July 3, 2020, 9:07 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/03/why-coronavirus-contact-tracing-appshavent-been-a-game-changer.html.
58 Id.; see also Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing, APPLE: COVID-19
https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing (last visited Nov. 14, 2020), for
the discussion of the joint initiative between Google and Apple to assist
governments with “reduc[ing] the spread of the virus with user privacy and
security central to the design” by using Bluetooth technology.
59 Apple and Google do not guarantee the user privacy of those
downloading their contact-tracing app, but rather say their Bluetooth
technology will “help governments and health agencies reduce the spread of
the virus . . . .” See Privacy-Preserving Contract Tracing, supra note 58
(emphasis added).
54
55
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It seems that user privacy and security cannot be
guaranteed, which is a vexing issue. If it is then of sufficient
concern that individuals will not download a contact-tracing app
on their phone at all. Of those who do load such an app, there
might be variability around whether the app is correctly
installed, whether it is installed but then uninstalled, and,
where the function exists, whether the installed app is activated
at all, some of the time, or all of the time. All of these activation
options affect the ability of the app to gather and report data.60
This, in turn, makes it difficult to ascertain the ideal number of
users as per the NHSX Report’s model.61 How governments have
determined the correct amount of social isolation definitively put
in place in the absence of contact-tracing apps operating at
desired functional levels, appears to be a matter of
“guesstimating.” Australia—whose constitutional makeup is
that of a Federation—is a prime example of one of the various
State governments that have simply closed borders between
states due to a rise in reported instances of COVID-19.62 Those
border closures have, for the most part, been against the
recommendations of the Australian Commonwealth (federal)
government and, in two cases, have caused constitutional
challenges to be raised by citizens.63
V.

THE COVIDSAFE APP

On March 18, 2020, Governor-General of Australia David
Hurley, pursuant to section 475 of the Australian Biosecurity
See David Nield, How to restrict the amount of data apps collect about
you,
NEWS ATLAS (Mar. 26, 2018), https://newatlas.com/data-collection-andprivacy/53959/.
61 See NHSX Report, supra note 47, at 3.
62 Jason Scott & Edward Johnson, Australia’s Most Populous States Close
Their Border After Coronavirus Cases Spike, TIME (July 6, 2020, 4:36 AM),
https://time.com/5863138/australia-victoria-new-south-wales-coronavirusspike-border/.
63 One challenge was raised by a politician and the other raised by a
businessperson. See Kyle Bridge, State border closures and the Australian
(June
15,
2020),
Constitution
–
are
they
legal?,
KELLS
https://www.kells.com.au/insights/local-government/state-border-closuresand-the-australian-constitution-are-they-legal/; Thomas Allen, Open The
Borders - A High Court Australia Constitutional Challenge, ARMSTRONG LEGAL,
https://www.armstronglegal.com.au/open-the-borders-a-high-court-australiaconstitutional-challenge/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2020).
60
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Act 2015 (the Biosecurity Act),64 made a declaration to
particularly address COVID-19.65
The First COVID-19
Declaration,66 asserted that COVID-19 had entered Australia
and had pandemic potential.67 The declaration has since been
extended pursuant to the powers contained in section 476 of the
Biosecurity Act.68 These are wide powers accompanied by fines
64 “The Governor-General may declare that a human biosecurity
emergency exists if the Health Minister is satisfied that: (a) a listed human
disease is posing a severe and immediate threat, or is causing harm, to human
health on a nationally significant scale; and (b) the declaration is necessary to
prevent or control: (i) the entry of the listed human disease into Australian
territory or a part of Australian territory; or (ii) the emergence, establishment
or spread of the listed human disease in Australian territory or a part of
Australian territory.” Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) ch 8 pt 2 div 2 s 475 (Austl.)
[hereinafter Biosecurity Act of 2015].
65 The Governor-General of Australia, being the representative of Queen
Elizabeth II, is Australia’s Head of State and the Commander-in-Chief of the
Australian Defence Force. About the Governor-General: The role of the
COMMONWEALTH
AUSTL.,
Governor-General,
GOVERNOR-GEN.
https://www.gg.gov.au/about-governor-general/role-governor-general
(last
visited Nov. 14, 2020). His Excellency General, the Honorable David Hurey AC
DSC (Ret.) took the advice of the Health Minister to declare a human
biosecurity emergency with respect to COVID-19 pursuant to section 475 of the
Biosecurity Act. Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency) (Human
Coronavirus with Pandemic Potential) Declaration 2020 (Cth) (Austl.)
[hereinafter First COVID-19 Declaration]. Section 6 of the Declaration states:
“[h]uman coronavirus with pandemic potential is an infectious disease: (a) that
has entered Australian territory; and (b) that is fatal in some cases; and (c)
that there was no vaccine against, or antiviral treatment for, immediately
before the commencement of this instrument; and (d) that is posing a severe
and immediate threat to human health on a nationally significant scale.” Id. s
6.
66 Section 7 of the First COVID-19 Declaration states that the declaration
ends on the last day of three months from the date of registration of the
instrument. First COVID-19 Declaration, supra note 65, s 7. Accordingly, a
second declaration was issued, effective May 15, 2020, with a sunset provision
effective September 17, 2020. Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency)
(Human Coronavirus with Pandemic Potential) Variation (Extension)
Instrument 2020 (Cth) ss 2, 4 (Austl.) [hereinafter Second COVID-19
Declaration].
67 First COVID-19 Declaration, supra note 65, s 6.
68 Biosecurity Act of 2015, supra note 64, ch 8 pt 2 div 2 s 476. Section 476
of the Biosecurity Act allows the biosecurity emergency period to vary over a
period of up to three months, in this case, an extension, where the Health
Minister is satisfied that the disease continues to pose a severe and immediate
threat, or is causing harm on a national scale, and, that the extension is
necessary to prevent or control the entry of the disease into Australia or the
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or imprisonment where directions are not followed.69 It is
apparent then, that the Australian government had the power,
once the declaration was made, for its Health Minister to make
emergency requirements and directions in respect of contacttracing.70 While traditional measures such as border closure and
self-isolation have been introduced, no compulsory contacttracing arrangements have been made; although it is suggested
that section 477 of the Act allows a decision of this nature,71 thus
allowing for an overriding of the usual privacy protections
offered to citizens in non-crisis times.
One of the interesting international aspects of COVID-19 is
the different measures taken by governments worldwide,72 as
well as commentary on the effectiveness of implemented
While contact-tracing is mentioned in the
measures.73
literature, it is not distinguished from other containment
measures, including physical distancing. Moreover, it remains
unclear whether containment measures in general are
universally effective.74 As a caveat to this observation, it is clear
establishment or spread of the disease. Id.
69 Id. ch 8 pt 2 div 6 s 479. Section 479 of the Biosecurity Act states that a
person who fails to comply with directions will commit an offense, carrying a
penalty of five years imprisonment. Id.
70 See id. s 477.
71 See id. s 477(1). Section 477(1) of the Biosecurity Act authorized the
Health Minister to make any determination deemed necessary. Id.
72 See Hannah Ritchie et al., Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19), OUR
WORLD DATA, https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus (last updated Nov. 14,
2020). The measures taken by governments and the relation of the number of
cases of COVID-19 compared with measures taken may be “tracked” on
numerous websites. See, e.g., id.; Track government measures on COVID-19
with the Oxford Government Response Tracker, EUR. DATA PORTAL (Sept. 4,
2020),
https://www.europeandataportal.eu/it/impact-studies/covid-19/trackgovernment-measures-covid-19-oxford-government-response-tracker
[hereinafter Oxford Gov’t Response Tracker].
73 See, for example, Rabail Chaudhry et al., A country level analysis
measuring the impact of government actions, country preparedness and
socioeconomic factors on COVID-19 mortality and related health outcomes,
LANCET: ECLINICALMEDICINE, July 2020, at 1, 1, for an unsurprising suggestion
that “low levels of national preparedness, scale of testing and population
characteristics were associated with increased national caseload and overall
mortality.”
74 See id. at 2. The authors note that “[m]easures such as the detection
and isolation of infected individuals, contact-tracing, quarantine measures,
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that the means of implementation, such as the restrictiveness of
interventions and the strictness of their enforcement, all have
an important role to play in their effectiveness; hence, the
interest in and importance of research that includes shared and
updated data for comparison.
Various countries have touted or developed contact tracing
apps, including the UK’s National Health Service (NHS),75
Germany,76 Singapore,77 Japan,78 and others.79 MIT has even
created a website to track the various reiterations of contact

physical distancing, and closure of non-essential businesses have become
major components of public health guidance, aiming to reduce the spread of
further infection, and prevent health system strain[,]” and furthermore,
“[a]lthough containment measures implemented in countries such as China,
South Korea, and Taiwan have reduced new cases by more than 90%, this has
not been the case in many other countries such as Italy, Spain and the United
States.” Id.
75 Gareth Iacobucci, Sixty seconds on . . . the contact tracing app, 369 BMJ
169,
171
(2020),
https://www.bmj.com/bmj/sectionpdf/1026718?path=/bmj/369/8244/This_Week.full.pdf. This announced a trial
on the Isle of Wight, id., which was later dropped in favor of an app based on
the Google and Apple model. See Jacqui Wise, UK drops its own contact tracing
app to switch to Apple and Google model, 369 BMJ 463, 466–67 (2020),
https://www.bmj.com/bmj/sectionpdf/1029956?path=/bmj/369/8251/This_Week.full.pdf.
76 Dominik Rehse, Contact-Tracing-App: Mit Anreizen und Tempo zur App
[Contact-Tracing: With incentives and speed for App], 100 WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST
310, 311 (2020), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/221988/1/10-1007s10273-020-2642-2.pdf. Germany eventually adopted the Google/Apple model
after the announcement of a joint effort by Deutsche Telekom and SAP. Id.
77 Trace
Together,
Safer
Together,
TRACETOGEHTER,
https://www.tracetogether.gov.sg/55/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2020). The
Government Technology Agency of Singapore advertised an incentive for their
app users with the opportunity to “win $55 Vouchers when you use Trace
Together and Safe Entry.” Id. Singapore is credited with creating the world’s
first major Bluetooth contact tracing app. See Charlotte Jee, Is a successful
contact tracing app possible? These countries think so, MIT TECH REV. (Aug. 10,
2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/10/1006174/covid-contracttracing-app-germany-ireland-success.
78 The June 2020 launch of the Japanese app, “Cocoa” (contact-confirming
application), has been difficult. See Satoshi Sugiyama, Japan’s contact-tracing
app suspended again to fix input glitch preventing alerts, JAPAN TIMES (July
11, 2020), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/11/national/japanscontact-tracing-app-glitch/.
79 Jee, supra note 77.
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tracing apps throughout the world.80
On April 26, 2020, the Australian federal government
launched the COVIDSafe Software Application (the app).81 The
Australian Prime Minister suggested that the more people who
download the app,82 the safer the app users, their family, and
their community would be, and ultimately, by downloading this
app, the sooner safety restrictions would be lifted, allowing
businesses to recover.83 From the moment the app launched, the
physical distancing measures—that are the hallmark of
population health measures for pandemics—were connected to
the country’s economic prosperity.84 Furthermore, the media

Patrick Howell O’Neill, Tate Ryan-Mosley & Bobbie Johnson, A flood of
coronavirus apps are tracking us. Now it’s time to keep track of them, MIT TECH.
REV.
(May
7,
2020),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1000961/launching-mittrcovid-tracing-tracker/. The authors note that “[t]here’s a deluge of apps that
detect your covid-19 exposure, often with little transparency” and that the
“Covid Tracing Tracker project will document them.” Id. By August 2020, the
database had documented 25 individual contact tracing efforts around the
world. Id.
81 Media Release, Prime Minister of Australia, et al., COVIDSafe: New
App to Slow the Spread of Coronavirus (Apr. 26, 2020, 3:13 PM),
https://www.pm.gov.au/media/covidsafe-new-app-slow-spread-coronavirus
[hereinafter Media Release].
82 According to the Australian Government, the app functions as follows:
“[w]hen 2 or more app users come close to each other their phones exchange
Bluetooth® signals and make a series of digital handshakes.” Background to
COVIDSafe, Close Contact Information: How COVIDSafe identifies close
contact, AUSTL. GOV’T, https://covidsafe.gov.au/background.html (last visited
Nov. 15, 2020). Then, “COVIDSafe notes the encrypted information held on
your phone through the strength of Bluetooth® signals. Once the information
is uploaded to the National COVIDSafe Data Store, it is then filtered so that
state and territory health officials can access close contacts.” Id. “The proximity
for a close contact is approximately 1.5 meters, for a period of 15 minutes or
more.” Id.
83 Media Release, supra note 81. As part of the media release, the Minister
for Health, Greg Hunt, stated: “[w]e are now calling on all Australians to
download the COVIDSafe app to help protect you, your family and your
community from further spread of COVID-19[which] will be necessary if we
are to start easing some of the difficult social distancing restrictions we have
had to put in place” and he noted that the app “will be one of the critical
tools . . . use[d] to help protect the health of the community by quickly alerting
people who may be at risk of having contact with COVID-19.” Id.
84 See id. The release indicated that “[t]he app . . . received strong support
80
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release clearly asserted that the data collected will be used for
the health and safety of the country, that the data cannot be
accessed by anyone outside the government tracing scheme, and
that a misuse of the data will result in criminal prosecution.85
Moreover, all of the data will be destroyed once the pandemic is
over.86
The voluntariness of the app is the key difficulty because it
requires an individual to download the app on their phone and,
if they are using an Apple iOS platform, to activate the app’s
operation.87 The app has failed to be adopted in sufficient
quantity and, therefore, it is difficult for the app to collect the
posited “sufficiency”88 of data that is needed to be useful in
containing the pandemic.89 That, in turn, may diminish the
public appetite to voluntarily adopt the app. It also reduces the
clarity around desired isolation parameters, where privacy and
economic considerations make that a complex decision.
We submit that the primary reason for the lack of adoption
from states and territories and the health sector, which recognise it is a
valuable tool that will enhance the ability to respond rapidly to local outbreaks,
and the confidence to know the virus is not silently spreading throughout
communities.” Id.
85 Id. Pursuant to the Biosecurity Act, whose broad charter is the
management of biosecurity threats, including human health within Australia
and its external territories, it is to be amended to cater to the effective
introduction of the app. Id.
86 See COVIDSafe app, After the pandemic, AUSTL. DEP’T HEALTH,
https://www.health.gov.au/resources/apps-and-tools/covidsafe-app#after-thepandemic (last updated Oct. 28, 2020) (“When the Minister for Health declares
the COVID-19 pandemic over, users will be prompted to delete the app from
their phone. This will delete all app information on a person’s phone. The
information contained in the National COVIDSafe Data Store will also be
destroyed at the end of the pandemic.”).
87 See Austl. Dep’t of Health, Coronavirus: Information on how to
download
the
COVIDSafe
app,
YOUTUBE
(June
4,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4lTSRhyqaU.
88 See Patrick Howell O’Neill, No, coronavirus apps don’t need 60%
adoption to be effective, MIT TECH. REV. (June 5, 2020),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/05/1002775/covid-apps-effectiveat-less-than-60-percent-download/.
89 See Chiara Farronato et al., How to Get People to Actually Use ContactTracing Apps, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 15, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/07/how-toget-people-to-actually-use-contact-tracing-apps.
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is not one of the widely cited reasons, such as concerns around
data privacy or “function creep” (the use of contact-tracing
information gathered being utilized for purposes other than
originally intended, such as by law enforcement bodies),90 but
rather because the Australian government failed to mandate its
adoption, notwithstanding the government’s full power to do
so.91 Before examining a mandated app in detail, it is first
necessary to consider the “noise” around the use, or lack of use,
of the Australian app to date.
Despite the Australian government’s assurances that data
gathered by the app is secure and that any breach of security
would be followed by criminal prosecution,92 Australians have
not embraced the app, notwithstanding the Department of
Health commissioning a Private Impact Assessment to address
and mitigate any identified privacy risks for the app.93 The
Norton Rose Fulbright comparative study suggests that some of
the possible reasons explaining why the app has not been widely
adopted are due generally to user privacy concerns.94
90 Norton Rose Fulbright Study, supra note 36; see also Rae Thomas et
al., More than privacy: Australians’ concerns and misconceptions about the
COVIDSafe App: a short report, MEDRXIV, June 9, 2020, at 1, for a survey
discussing “that the reasons for not downloading included privacy concerns,
phone capabilities, and beliefs of limited benefit.” “COVIDSafe knowledge
varied with confusion about purpose and capabilities. Public health messaging
will need to address these perceptions to achieve sufficient uptake.” Id.
91 See
COVIDSafe
app,
Privacy,
AUSTL.
DEP’T
HEALTH,
https://www.health.gov.au/resources/apps-and-tools/covidsafe-app#privacy
(last updated Oct. 28, 2020); Biosecurity Act of 2015, supra note 64, s 477(1).
92 Media Release, supra note 81. Initially, privacy protections were
contained in the First COVID-19 Declaration. See First COVID-19 Declaration,
supra note 65. Privacy protections were also contained in the Second COVID19 Declaration. See Second COVID-19 Declaration, supra note 66. On May 15,
2020, these were disestablished and enacted as changes to the Privacy Act
(1988), which “was introduced to promote and protect the privacy of individuals
and to regulate how Australian Government agencies and organisations with
an annual turnover of more than $3 million, and some other organisations,
handle personal information.” Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Austl.).
93 See MADDOCKS, DEPT. OF HEALTH: THE COVIDSAFE APPLICATION:
PRIVACY
IMPACT
ASSESSMENT
pt.
A,
3—13
(2020),
https://www.health.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2020/04/covidsafeapplication-privacy-impact-assessment-covidsafe-application-privacy-impactassessment.pdf.
94 See Norton Rose Fulbright Study, supra note 36.
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Specifically, their report suggests that “function creep” might be
a factor, although the Privacy Act (1988) was amended in 202095
to clarify that the information gathered is private.96 The app
does not use GPS (location tracking) and, therefore, the initial
concerns around the government using the app to track people
have been somewhat allayed.97 The source code for the app was
released on a GitHub repository,98 allowing interested
stakeholders to review it in order to provide a measure of
restoring faith in the privacy of collected data. The Australian
government also sought assurances via an independent
cybersecurity review99 of the app100 and sought to address
technical concerns around the effectiveness of the app on an iOS
operating system.101

Id.; see generally Privacy Amendment (Public Health Contact
Information) Act 2020 (Cth) (Austl.) [hereinafter Privacy Act Amendment]. The
purpose of the amendments to the Privacy Act was to provide for a range of
offenses and privacy protections in relation to the collection, use, disclosure,
and deletion of data in connection with the COVIDSafe contact tracing app.
Explanatory Memorandum, Privacy Amendment (Public Health Contact
Information) Bill 2020 (Cth) 4 (Austl.). The Bill was passed by both houses on
May 20, 2020. Id.
96 See Privacy Act Amendment, supra note 95, p VIIIA div 1. Specifically,
section 94B of the Privacy Amendment states that the object of the amendment
is “to assist in preventing and controlling the entry, emergence, establishment
or spread of the coronavirus known as COVID-19 into Australia or any part of
Australia by providing stronger privacy protections for COVID app data and
COVIDSafe users in order to: (a) encourage public acceptance and uptake of
COVIDSafe; and (b) enable faster and more effective contact tracing.” Id. p
VIIIA div 1 s 94B.
97 See Austl. Dep’t of Health, Background to COVIDSafe, Privacy and
Security
–
COVIDSafe
cannot
track
location,
AUSTL. GOV’T,
https://covidsafe.gov.au/background.html#COVIDSafe-cannot-track-location
(last visited Oct. 19, 2020).
98 COVIDSafe, GITHUB, https://github.com/AU-COVIDSafe (last visited
Nov. 15, 2020).
99 See
generally
CYBER
SEC.
COOP.
RSCH.
CTR.,
https://www.cybersecuritycrc.org.au/#research-programs (last visited Nov. 15,
2020), for background information regarding the research team that conducted
an assessment on Australia’s COVIDSafe app.
100 See, e.g., Jane Norman, Coronavirus tracing app given thumbs up by
independent cyber security agency, ABC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2020, 10:19 AM),
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-21/cyber-agency-supports-securitycoronavirus-tracing-app/12168136 (exemplifying how the review obtained
national attention).
101 See COVIDSafe app, Privacy, supra note 91. See also COVIDSafe app,
95
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The Norton Rose Fulbright comparative study also
canvasses the private sector concerns arising from the use of the
app.102 For Australia, the study notes that “the data in the
COVIDSafe App can not be used by private organisations.”103
Also, it is noted that while Amazon Web Services (AWS) provides
infrastructure and support, the Australian government stated
that the U.S. government does not have access to the data in the
hands of AWS.104 This has been challenged by legal experts
warning that AWS must still respond to a U.S. subpoena issued
to them.105 The other private sector concern is that there tends
to be a centralization of private information with the new
COVID-19 measures in place.106 However, this is balanced
against the need for the government to ensure the safety of its
population such that some adverse impact on privacy will
occur.107 There are currently no alternate de-centralized
approaches in play.
It is apparent that there is a range of issues related to

AUSTL.
DEP’T
HEALTH,
https://www.health.gov.au/resources/apps-andtools/covidsafe-app (last updated Oct. 28, 2020), for regular updates made by
the Australian Government Department of Heath regarding the status and
operation of the app.
102 Norton Rose Fulbright Study, supra note 36. This is interesting
because it acknowledges that the app, and the wider issue of COVID-19 and
data security, is a public-private agglomeration, rather than a public sector
responsibility. See supra Section II.
103 Norton Rose Fulbright Study, supra note 36.
104 Id.
105 Dylan Welch & Linton Besser, Experts warn there are still legal ways
the US could obtain COVIDSafe data, ABC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2020, 9:38 PM),
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-28/covidsafe-tracing-app-data-may-notbe-protected-from-usa/12189372; see also Chris Duckett, Home Affairs says US
CLOUD Act will not be able to penetrate Hunt COVIDSafe Directive, ZDNET
(May 5, 2020), https://www.zdnet.com/article/home-affairs-says-us-cloud-actwill-not-be-able-to-penetrate-hunt-covidsafe-directive/
(noting
prior
negotiations with the U.S. Department of Justice that each countries’ laws will
prevail, respectively, with regard to data stored).
106 See Brandi Vincent, NIH Unveils Centralized Resource for COVID-19
Patient Data, NEXTGOV (June 16, 2020), https://www.nextgov.com/analyticsdata/2020/06/nih-unveils-centralized-resource-covid-19-patient-data/166198/.
107 See Muneeb Ali, Decentralization: Preserving Personal Privacy While
Fighting
COVID-19,
COINTELEGRAPH,
(June
7,
2020),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/decentralization-preserving-personal-privacywhile-fighting-covid-19.
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privacy and differing opinions thereto. While some Australians
have asked questions about the virus,108 it is more likely that a
majority of these individuals have not read the expert
commentary on privacy issues—including the Privacy Impact
Assessment—instead relying on their local media, people within
their own social circle, and their own opinion.109 Wherever data
is stored and no matter what protections on the data is afforded,
it seems axiomatic that most people are disinclined to believe
the assurances provided by authorities and accordingly lack
trust such that they do not willingly and wittingly provide
personal data. It is therefore unsurprising that individuals do
not opt-in or load the app on their phones, despite assurances
made about data retention and misuse.110 With respect to the
concerns raised in other countries by contact-tracing, such
findings are outlined in the Norton Rose Fulbright study,111 and
human-rights interest groups statements more generally,112

108 See Sherryn Groch & Felicity Lewis, Can you catch COVID-19 from
Aussie bats? When are you immune? Your questions answered, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (May 6, 2020), https://www.smh.com.au/national/what-sthe-death-rate-how-long-will-it-last-your-covid-19-questions-answered20200323-p54cy7.html, for a discussion regarding disease immunity and
whether flying bats can pass on COVID-19.
109 This would make for an interesting survey—to sample across the
population the awareness of the app and the decisions made in respect of
adoption, including it being “too hard.”
110 See Phil Mercer, Australia Urges Citizens to Download COVID-19
NEWS
(May
4,
2020,
6:17
AM),
Tracing
App,
VOA
https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/australia-urges-citizensdownload-covid-19-tracing-app.
111 Norton Rose Fulbright Study, supra note 36.
112 Graham Greenleaf & Katharine Kemp, Australia’s ‘COVIDSafe App’:
An Experiment in Surveillance, Trust and Law (Apr. 30, 2020) (working paper)
(on file with the Univ. of New S. Wales Law Faculty Research Series). One of
the criticisms of the Australian determination made by the Health Minister is
that the instrument may be modified, repealed, or altered pursuant to section
477 of the Biosecurity Act and therefore a contact-tracing app may “pose
extreme risks to many civil liberties including privacy, freedom of movement
and freedom of association . . . .” Id. at 5–6. Note also the ethical and religious
viewpoints that come into play. See Samuel Volkin, Digital Contact Tracing
Poses Ethical Challenges, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV.: HUB (May 26, 2020),
https://hub.jhu.edu/2020/05/26/digital-contact-tracing-ethics/, for a discussion
by Jeffrey Kahn, director of the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics,
regarding “the ethical considerations of using digital technologies for public
health surveillance during the COVID-19 pandemic.”
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relating to trust,113 liberty and freedom.
In Australia, as of June 2, 2020, just over six million copies
of the app had been downloaded.114 Half that number signed up
within the first three days and the remaining three million
signed up within a month.115 Flattening off in adoption in such
circumstances is typical;116 however, from the perspective of the
app’s usefulness to assist in curbing the pandemic, this data is
somewhat troubling. The current population of Australia is
about 25 million, so the app in Australia is becoming
irrelevant.117 Similarly, the TraceTogether app launched in
Singapore has a less than 20% take-up118 and, again, residents
are concerned about their personal movement being tracked.119

113 Katharine Kemp, Trust, UNSW SYDNEY: GRAND CHALLENGES,
https://grandchallenges.unsw.edu.au/themes/trust (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).
The University of New South Wales’ new Grand Challenge on Trust notes a
recent “disdain for evidence, critical thinking and impartiality” and that they
“will work to address this crisis, by building connections and incubating new
initiatives that explore themes such as trust in institutions, trust in experts
and trust in technology and data.” Id.; see also To Download the Covid-19 App,
or Not to Download?, 2SER 107.3 (Apr. 20, 2020), https://2ser.com/to-downloadthe-covid-19-app-or-not-to-download/ (discussing changes needed, such as
decentralization, to gain greater trust of Australians using the COVID-19
tracing app).
114 Sophie Meixner, How many people have downloaded the COVIDSafe
app and how central has it been to Australia’s coronavirus response?, ABC
NEWS (June 1, 2020, 7:01 PM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-0602/coronavirus-covid19-covidsafe-app-how-many-downloads-greghunt/12295130.
115 Id.
116 See
Interpreting
technology
hype,
GARTNER,
https://www.gartner.com/en/research/methodologies/gartner-hype-cycle (last
visited Nov. 23, 2020).
117 Australia’s COVIDSafe Tracking App Is Slowly Becoming Irrelevant,
PRIV.
AUSTL.,
https://privacyaustralia.net/covidsafe-app-becomesirrelevant/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=covidsafeapp-becomes-irrelevant (last updated July 1, 2020).
118 Greenleaf & Kemp, supra note 112, at 3.
119 Dewey Sim & Kimberly Lim, Coronavirus: why aren’t Singapore
residents using the TraceTogether contact-tracing app?, S. CHINA MORNING
POST:
CORONAVIRUS
PANDEMIC
(May
18,
2020,
6:45
PM),
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/people/article/3084903/coronavirus-whyarent-singapore-residents-using-tracetogether.
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Consequently, for Australia, there is insufficient interest in
the adoption and use of the app, or thereby, to ensure its role in
specialized physical isolation. This means that at the time of
this writing, the states of Australia had closed borders, because
large scale physical isolation of the population by geographic
region—while imprecise and somewhat over-reaching—is more
certain than relying on the quick method that might have been
delivered by the app,120 had the app been more widely accepted
and adopted by the Australian population.121 Further, experts
in law and information systems opine that the Australian
contact-tracing arrangements are lacking and are in need of
amendment.122
Notwithstanding the considerable effort made by the
Australian federal government to encourage adoption of the app,
the lack of adoption thereof begs the thought as to how one might
go about ensuring that life-saving technology, such as contacttracing, might be better used in the event of a pandemic such as
COVID-19.123
120 See COVIDSafe app, About the app, AUSTL. DEP’T HEALTH,
https://www.health.gov.au/resources/apps-and-tools/covidsafe-app#about-theapp (last updated Oct. 28, 2020). Installation of the app was voluntary and
marketed on the basis that it will “protect you, your family and friends and
save the lives of other Australians.” Id. Registration required the entry of a
name (which may be a pseudonym), age range, mobile number, and postcode.
COVIDSafe app, How COVIDSafe works, AUSTL. DEP’T HEALTH,
https://www.health.gov.au/resources/apps-and-tools/covidsafe-app#howcovidsafe-works (last updated Oct. 28, 2020).
121 See MADDOCKS, supra note 93, pt. A, § 1.3, at 3 (“Ensuring public trust
in the operation of the App will be critical to its successful roll-out.”).
122 Graham Greenleaf & Katharine Kemp, Australia’s COVIDSafe App
needs more legal protections and transparency to gain trust, UNSW SYDNEY
LAW (May 1, 2020), https://www.law.unsw.edu.au/news/australias-covidsafeapp-needs-more-legal-protections-and-transparency-to-gain-trust-0.
123 See MADDOCKS, supra note 93, pt. A, § 3.2, at 4–5. This is so because,
while the Maddock’s Private Impact Assessment found that stakeholders
ensured the development of the app was via a “privacy by design” approach,
further work was required, including: “communication to the public, with
clarity about the function and purpose of the App, how the App will work, what
personal information will be collected by the App, and how that information
will be used; the need for further assurance that personal information collected
through the App will only be used for contact tracing; the minimisation of risks
associated with loss of control over the personal information collected through
the App once the information is disclosed to State and Territory Public Health
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VI. DEFAULT OPTIONS
Given that the voluntary up-take of the app is relatively low,
how might governments tackle this dilemma in the future?
Apparently, making contact-tracing apps available does not
result in widespread adoption per se; nor, as is the case for
Australia, does widespread information and assurances about
the operation of the app result in widespread adoption.124
Generally speaking, begging does not increase the voluntary
adoption of most things—neither does offering incentives for
citizens result in ubiquitous acceptance. With respect to contacttracing, Australia seeks the former unsuccessfully,125 while
Singapore seeks the latter, also unsuccessfully, by offering the
possibility of winning a prize for citizens loading up the
TraceTogether app on their cell phones.126 These are not optimal
situations in times of crisis. Yet, optimality is critical in times
of disaster.127 Some might suggest that more sampling of the
app via “randomized trials” is necessary to determine whether
the app can be directly responsible for reducing COVID-19
infections.128 However, this sampling is problematic and

Officials and Contact Tracers; the need to ensure maximum application of the
‘data minimisation principle’, so that the minimum amount of personal
information required is collected; the need to ensure that consent is voluntary,
and provided so that Users of the App properly understand how their personal
information will be handled; the need to ensure that appropriate consent is
obtained from parents/guardians for Users who are children under the age of
16; the need for further assurance around potential security risks; further
clarity about retention of personal information collected through the App after
the end of the COVID-19 pandemic; and the desirability of further clarity about
data governance arrangements, including in ICT and other contracts or other
arrangements, between entities involved in the implementation and operation
of the App.” Id.
124 See Mercer, supra note 110; Privacy Act Amendment, supra note 95, p
VIIIA.
125 Mercer, supra note 110.
126 Trace Together, Safer Together, supra note 77.
127 Samira Sadat Pourhosseini, Ali Ardalan & Mohammad Hossien
Mehrolhassani, Key Aspects of Providing Healthcare Services in Disaster
Response Stage, 44 IRAN J. PUB. HEALTH 111, 114 (2015).
128 Kelly Servick, COVID-19 contact tracing apps are coming to a phone
near you. How will we know whether they work?, SCI. MAG. (May 21, 2020, 5:10
PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/05/countries-around-world-arerolling-out-contact-tracing-apps-contain-coronavirus-how.
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expensive.129 Time and money are not presently in a relatively
large supply. The fastest way to determine the relation between
contact-tracing apps and COVID infections was for Australia to
mandate—and enforce—the use of the app.
It is certainly the case that the Australian government was
empowered to mandate the app.130 However, such an action was
presumably deemed unpalatable.131
What else can the
government do? The evidence for this as a possible solution to
larger-scale
physical
isolation,
privacy
concerns
notwithstanding, comes from another life-saving quarter: organ
donations.132
In the field of behavioral economics, it has been shown that
defaults save lives.133 Johnson and Goldstein have argued, in a
paper published in 2003, that default options may lead to
remarkable differences in the preferences of individuals, and
their study of organ donors across countries outlines this
point.134 There are also strong arguments in favor of variations
on the default option, such as “mandated choice.”135 Johnson
and Goldstein used both natural and experimental data across
three experiments by testing to see the difference between
asking potential donors whether they wanted to be an organ
donor (as against the default option of being an organ donor)
and, in order to opt-out, needing to make the choice not to be an

Id.
See Biosecurity Act of 2015, supra note 64, ch 8 p 2 d 2 s 477.
131 Greenleaf & Kemp, supra note 112, at 2, 9–10.
132 See generally Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save
Lives?, 302 SCI. MAG. 1338, 1338–39 (2003) (providing background material
regarding organ donation statistics and the default rules of various countries).
133 Id. at 1339.
134 Id. at 1338–39.
135 Such approaches require a timely advanced choice by citizens, as
opposed to an opt-in or opt-out process. See P. Chouhan & H. Draper, Modified
mandated choice for organ procurement, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 157, 159 (2003);
Susan E. Herz, Two Steps to Three Choices: A New Approach to Mandated
Choice, 8 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 340, 342 (1999); Aaron Spital,
Mandated Choice for Organ Donation: Time to Give It a Try, 125 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 66, 67 (1996). For the purposes of this article, the authors do
not endorse any particular approach.
129
130
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organ donor.136 In the countries where presumed consent (optout) was the rule, organ donors ranged from the lowest of 85.9%
in Sweden to the highest of 99.98% in Austria.137 Where explicit
consent was required for organ donation (opt-in) the rates in
surveyed countries ranged from the lowest of 4.25% in Denmark
to the highest of 27.5% in The Netherlands.138 Note, however,
that in the case of The Netherlands, there was a concerted and
consistent campaign to raise the level of organ donations,
including sending 12 million letters and the creation of a
national donor registry that “failed to change the effective
consent rate.”139
Although the Johnson and Goldstein study was motivated
by the low permission rates of organ donation in the United
States, which was paradoxically at odds with the then 85%
approval of the idea of organ donation ultimately in the United
States,140 the study researched European countries.141
In 2012, the Australian government introduced “My Health
Record” as an opt-in online health record, holding personal key
health information for each Australian; however, in 2016, the
Australian government changed this to an opt-out process.142
The idea of the record was to facilitate medical professional
access to a patient’s health record for general information or in
Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 132, at 1338.
Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 1339.
140 Id. at 1338; see also THE GALLUP ORG., INC., THE AMERICAN PUBLIC’S
ATTITUDES TOWARD ORGAN DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION (1993),
[https://web.archive.org/web/19990209044121/http://www.transweb.org:80/ref
erence/articles/gallup_survey/gallup_index.html], for a survey conducted by
The Gallup Organization for The Partnership for Organ Donation at Harvard
School of Public Health on American’s attitudes toward organ donation and
transplantation.
141 Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 132, at 1338–39.
142 Evaluation of the My Health Record Participation Trials, AUSTL. DEP’T
HEALTH,
https://www1.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/ehealthevaluation-trials (last updated May 4, 2017); Austl. Digital Health Agency,
What is My Health Record?, Background information, MY HEALTH REC.,
https://www.myhealthrecord.gov.au/for-you-your-family/what-is-my-healthrecord (last visited Nov. 18, 2020).
136
137

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/2

28

2020

An Australian Conundrum

71

the circumstances of an emergency.143 After concerns were
raised around the change to opt-out, including by those
concerned about data privacy,144 the Australian government
made some amendments to allow permanent destruction of
records and to disallow privatization or commercialization of the
system.145
Under the unamended version of the Australian scheme,
around 2.5 million Australians—around ten percent of the
Australian population—had opted out of the scheme and, of
those, 1.147 million —nearly half of the 2.5 million Australians
that opted out—withdrew their consent after the opt-out period
was extended.146 Additional cancellations occurred when the
amendments were introduced.147 Nonetheless, at the relevant
time, the Australian position meant that 90% of the population
had selected the online health record by default in stark contrast
with the opt-in position.148 Recall that the download of the
COVIDSafe app in Australia sits at above six million—over 25%
of the population.149

143 Austl. Digital Health Agency, What is My Health Record?, My Health
Record is an online summary of your key health information, MY HEALTH REC.,
https://www.myhealthrecord.gov.au/for-you-your-family/what-is-my-healthrecord (last visited Nov. 18, 2020).
144 Austl. Digital Health Agency,
Australian Government passes
legislation to strengthen My Health Record privacy, MY HEALTH REC. (Nov. 26,
2018), https://www.myhealthrecord.gov.au/news-and-media/my-health-recordstories/legislation-strengthens-privacy.
145 Media Release, Austl. Digital Health Agency, Austl. Gov’t, Opt in or
opt out of My Health Record at any time in your life: Australian Parliament
strengthens privacy protections of My Health Record (Nov. 26, 2018, 10:54 PM),
https://www.myhealthrecord.gov.au/news-and-media/media-releases/opt-inor-opt-out-any-time.
146 Justin Hendry, Millions opt-out of My Health Record: ADHA Reveals
Final
Figure,
ITNEWS
(Feb.
20,
2019,
4:24
PM),
https://www.itnews.com.au/news/millions-opt-out-of-my-health-record519572.
147 Id.
148 SIGGINS MILLER, EVALUATION OF THE PARTICIPATION TRIALS FOR THE MY
HEALTH
RECORD:
FINAL
REPORT
124
(2016),
https://www1.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/A892B3781
E14E1B3CA25810C000BF7C6/$File/Evaluation-of-the-My-Health-RecordParticipation-Trials-Report.pdf
149 Meixner, supra note 114.
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Nonetheless, it is apparent that Australians are fairly wary
about their health information being online and accessible; by
means fair or foul, and part of their objections in the case of My
Health Record, may very well have arisen about opt-out
determining the default position.150 This may be in part because
Australia is a Western democracy and its approach towards
authority follows same; something it shares in common with the
United States and most of Europe.151
It is true that neither the organ donation study nor the
Australian health record example, amount to determinative
positions regarding how to approach the adoption of an app in a
global pandemic; but they are at least instructive. The Johnson
and Goldstein study elucidates that the way options are framed
does appear to influence the outcome that follows.152 This also
holds true for the Australian experience with My Health Record
and the COVIDSafe app.153 It seems reasonable to infer from
the Australian experience that opt-ins affecting the privacy of
information present a very difficult question: a question most
likely to be deferred, and by default, an opt-in not being selected.
To what extent such deferral is impacted upon by such privacy
concerns is—in the pure sense or in the more complex—
encompassing other concerns, including the source of data such
as biobanking and concerns arising from the possible adoption
Including researcher opinion that the system seemed less suited for
healthcare and more suited to the collection of data. See Paul Power, Opinion:
Is there a smarter way for the controversial My Health Record system?,
IT
NEWS
(Apr.
1,
2019),
HEALTHCARE
https://www.healthcareit.com.au/article/opinion-there-smarter-waycontroversial-my-health-record-system.
151 See Sam Schechner, French Contact-Tracing App Struggles with Slow
Adoption. It Isn’t Alone, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2020, 3:12 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/french-contact-tracing-app-struggles-with-slowadoption-it-isnt-alone-11592928266 (“[T]here are signs France isn’t alone in
seeing low adoption levels. Italy’s app recently crossed three million
downloads, which covers around 5% to 6% of its population. Denmark’s app is
at 300,000 downloads or roughly 5%. Norway, for its part, recently suspended
use of its app after complaints from privacy regulators, who said the low
incidence of the disease no longer made the app worth the encroachment on
individual privacy it required.”).
152 Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 132, at 1338.
153 See SIGGINS MILLER, supra note 148, at 85; COVIDSafe app, About the
app, supra note 120.
150
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and commercialization of data, which remains, for now,
unanswered.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the event of a pandemic, we posit that there lies a difficult
balance for governments between liberty on the one hand, and
prospects of survival on the other; with respect to the latter,
apparently lies the question on how to achieve it, without giving
up too much prosperity in the process. It is a complex and
difficult decision for a government because it involves an
inevitable compromise of factors such as privacy, data security,
ethical considerations, and safety that conflate the ideological
differences between the rights of the individual on the one hand,
and the whole-of-society on the other.
The Australian COVIDSafe app is an example of the
difficulties associated with dealing with a complex and evolving
pandemic. While there is no apparent solution as to how to best
deal with a crisis that changes often and quickly, it at least
seems apparent that where digital options—such as an app—are
available and, where those options might be used for the
immediate and beneficial societal health improvement and
protection, governments might find opt-out determinations more
immediately useful. That being so, then the fallout from the use
of the opt-out option can be altered, eased, or removed when the
health crisis is averted. When and for whom this is the most
appropriate course of action is a matter, at least in Western
countries, for their democratically elected leaders.
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